2-4910

January 2, 1952

Brigadier General John Weckerling, Chief Intelligence Division Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I am entering the services soon. I would be glad to serve my country in any way, but I hope I could serve in military intelligence in the manner suggested in this letter. I know that the general nature of the idea I am suggesting may sound crack-pot and as unsound as similar suggestions that reach the Army of similar nature. There are ways of testing on my own personal worth: you could have a board of psychologists check and see whether my thoughts are sound—and whether my ideas are crack-pot. You have nothing to lose in giving me an interview about this matter and in giving me a chance to prove myself. However if I can make a few accurate predictions about Russian plans those predictions—if true—would prove invaluable. If you want me to be more explicit and to explain more about this matter please write me about it.

Since about the whole purpose of military intelligence is to predict future actions based upon information, observation, analysis, psychology, judgment and military science, I know that you are interested in the ability of predicting future actions. I hope that I can offer a method of predicting future actions. I have had incredible accuracy. Part of the basis of the method is in the psychology of the individuals who are being studied. On the basis of my record I have come to have the nomenclature, among some, of the prophet. I am supposed to be highly psychic. Whether or not psychic phenomena are genuine it provides a convenient and inclusive term to describe an acute sense of being aware of what is transpiring elsewhere without tangible direct experience.

Psychological analysis of enemy plans and personnel was practiced—as you probably know—by Germany and Pritain. The British had a board of psychologists who had an amazing record of foretelling the trend of Hitler's future actions. And the Germans made a psychological study of the "Order of Battle" of the Allied armies.

Having personally had success in judging the characteristics of national leaders and the intent of enemy plans, I will be able to foretell enemy plans and actions in the future. Following is a partial list of things that I have predicted in the last year: (Jan) Pres. Truman would take a vacation at Key West; (Jan) China is negotiating at U. N. to get our army out of Korea; she wants to dictate terms for Indo-China. The attempted assination of Pres. Truman.

Joe Stalin, I said, will come out with his stale routine about there being no present cause for war. And he would criticize the performance of American troops in Korea. And he would say, "and it stands to reason..." (Jan) Korea is not a yardstick for a general war. (Jan) They are going to set off an atom bomb at Las Veras, N. M. It is bigger than the last bomb. It is bigger than the little bomb...that killed 300,000 people. They will feel it in four states.

(Jan) I predicted that Prime Minister Nehru and the representative from Pakistan would say to each other when they met.

(Jan) The United States is working on an atom-powered submarine and is going to have an atom-powered airplance. I suggested that to a large extent the poor showing in Korea was caused by the Army not adapting itself to the situation.

I revealed that the Army had radar and infra-red ray detection of mechanized equipment.

I have predicted many other diverse and important things too numerous to mention. But I hope the examples cited prove I have something to offer.

I am,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Leo P. Roberts

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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